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1. Projection is what the mind engages in when, as Humc puts the 
idea, it 'spreads itselr on to the external world. 1 This image certainly 
seems to fit some ways of thinking and talking that we can be tempted 
into: consider for instance the confused notion that disgustingncss is a 
property that some things have intrinsically or absolutely, independently 
of their relations to us-a property of which our feelings of disgust 
constitute a kind of perception. That this notion is confused is of course 
no reason to suppose it cannot be true that something is disgusting. But 
the image of projection, figuring as it docs in an explanation of how the 
confused notion comes about, might be useful in correcting a possible 
misconception of what such truth would amount to. My question in this 
lecture is whether the image is well suited to a similar employment in the 
field of ethics. 
In connection with the prospects for crediting ethical statements or 
judgments with truth, David Wiggins has pressed a distinction between 
what he calls 'valuations', on the one hand, and 'directives or deliber-
ative (or practical) judgements', on the othcr. 2 It is in relation to the 
former category that the attribution of truth is most immediately 
attractive: valuations arc not easily assimilated to, for instance, deci-
sions what to do, but naturally strike us as correct or incorrect according 
to whether or not they accurately delineate the values that are to be 
found in their subject matter. This feature of valuations makes them also 
the most immediately tempting field for an application of the idea of 
projection: the phenomenology that makes the attribution of truth 
attractive can seem well explained as the upshot of a projection of what 
Hume would call 'sentiments' on to their objects. Without prejudice to 
the possibility of extending the discussion to Wiggins's other category, 
for the purposes of this lecture I shall generally have valuations in mind. 
In the case of the supposedly absolute or intrinsic property of 
disgustingness, what projection leads to is error: one takes what one in 
fact spreads on to the external world to be something one finds in the 
world on to which one spreads it, something that is there anyway-that 
is, there independently of human or sentient responses to things. It may 
seem that any projective thinking must be metaphysically erroneous in 
this way: the associated 'error theory' in ethics was embraced, as is well 
known, by J. L. Mackie. :I But we have to take note of a different use of 
the image of projection, which has been elaborated in a number of 
writings by Simon Blackburn. The position Blackburn describes, and 
recommends for ethics in particular, is what he calls 'quasi-realism'. 
This aims to demonstrate that, starting from the claim that a mode of 
thinking (valuation in our particular case) is projective, we can see how 
it can, without confusion, exemplify nevertheless all the twists of 
thought and speech that might seem to signal a fully realist metaphysic, 
although-since they are now provided for within a projectivist frame-
work-it must be a mistake to suppose they signal any such thing. 4 
According to Hume, when our 'taste' is projected on to the world, it 
'raises in a manner a new creation'. 5 Blackburn's proposal, in effect, is 
that this 'new creation' can be sufficiently robust to underwrite the 
presence of the trappings of realism, so to speak, in thought and speech 
which is correctly understood as projective; and that participants in such 
thought and speech need not be led by those elements of it into missing 
its projective nature. We can be clear, even as we suppose that our 
judgments accurately delineate the contours of reality, that it is only the 
'new creation', a product of projection, that is in question. 
2. A tension arises in Blackburn's separation ofprojectivism from an 
error theory. (I mention this not to make it a problem for him, but to 
bring out a point that will be important in what follows.) To begin with 
at least, it is natural to put the projectivist thought, and Blackburn 
characteristically does put it, by saying that ethical commitments should 
not be understood as having truth-conditions. That would represent 
ethical remarks as statements about how things arc, and according to 
projectivism they should be taken rather to express attitudes or senti-
ments. 6 But quasi-realism is supposed to make room for all the trappings 
of realism, including the idea that the notion of truth applies after all to 
ethical remarks. In that case, the original sharp contrast between putting 
forward a candidate for being true and expressing an attitude or 
sentiment cannot be right: a remark that expresses an attitude can also 
affirm a truth. Does this mean that projectivist quasi-realism is self-
defeating?7 
Not if we can distinguish what the projectivist starting-point rejects 
from what the quasi-realist conclusion establishes as acceptable. It may 
be tempting to suppose that this can be done only if we discern two 
different notions of truth, one to figure in the projectivist denial that 
ethical statements can be true, and the other to figure in the quasi-realist 
reinstatement of ethical truth. 8 However, this is not how Blackburn 
resolves the tension.9 What Blackburn does-and this is centrally 
important to the point I want to make-is to contrast an unearned appeal 
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to the notion of truth, which is what the projectivist rejects, with an 
earned right to the use of the notion, which is what the quasi-realist 
reinstates. The point about the application of the notion of truth that 
quasi-realism is supposed to make available is that we do not merely 
help ourselves to it, but work for it. 
The contrast-the unearned employment of the notion of truth that 
projectivism rejects-is a position that expands reality by mere postula-
tion, beyond what the projectivist is comfortable with, to include an 
extra population of distinctively value-involving states of affairs or facts. 
Corresponding to this, it purports to equip us with special cognitive 
faculties by whose exercise we become aware of this special field of 
knowable fact. These special cognitive faculties are vaguely assimilated 
to the senses, but no detailed account can be given of how they operate, 
such as might make it clear to us-as clear as it is in the case of the 
senses-how their exercise affords us access to the relevant range of 
circumstances. The assimilation to the senses gives this intuitionistic 
position the superficial appearance of offering an epistemology of our 
access to valuational truth, but there is no substance behind this 
appearance. 
How docs projcctivism improve on this rather clearly disreputable 
position? 
The basic projcctivist idea is that ethical remarks express not 
mysterious 'cognizings' of valuational facts, but attitudes. Now if that 
were the whole story, there would not be much prospect of a substantial 
notion of truth; think of the practice of expressing one's attitudes to 
various Havours of icc cream. But there is an extra ingredient to the 
story, which quasi-realism exploits. The attitudes are the upshot of 
sensibilities: that is, propensities to form various attitudes in response to 
various features of situations. Ethical sensibilities are themselves subject 
to attitudes of approbation or disapprobation; and-that is the crucial 
thing-these attitudes to sensibilities are a matter for argument and 
criticism. 10 We are not content simply to go along with the flow of our 
sensibilities as they stand, regardless of how they fare under critical 
scrutiny; and we are not at liberty to rank sensibilities at random and 
still be taken seriously as participants in ethical discussion. Truth, in a 
remark that has to be understood in the first instance as expressive of an 
attitude, can now be explained in terms of the fact that the sensibility 
from which the attitude issues stands up to the appropriate kind of 
criticism. 
To complete the picture, we should need an account of the nature of 
the criticism to which ethical sensibilities are subject. In part the critical 
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assessment in question is formal, involving requirements like consis-
tency. But there are also substantive constraints on whether a sensibility 
is acceptable: these derive-so Blackburn seems to suggest-from the 
function of ethical thought and speech in helping to secure such goods as 
social order and co-operation. 11 This sketch will serve for the present: as 
we shall see, a crucial issue opens up when one sets out to be less 
schematic. 
3. It is hard to imagine that anyone would explicitly deny that if 
truth in ethics is available, it needs to be earned. It seems clear, 
moreover, that one would be deceiving oneself if one thought that those 
vague analogies with perception amounted to earning it. If the idea that 
truth must be earned is located as, precisely, a corrective to the 
unhelpful intuitionistic realism that Blackburn is primarily concerned to 
reject, it can seem to establish a conclusion about a metaphysical basis 
on which ethical truth must be worked for: realism shirks the obligation, 
and the clear alternative is projectivism. But it is questionable whether 
that is the right setting in which to place the idea that truth must be 
earned. 
Consider a view of the current predicament of ethics on the lines of 
Alasdair Macintyre's in Afttr Virtue. 12 According to Macintyre, the 
description of ethical language given by C. L. Stevenson-although it is 
not, as Stevenson claimed, a correct description of ethical language as 
such-has come to be true of the ethical language that is actually at our 
disposal. One crucial ingredient of Stevenson's picture is the implication 
that no substantial distinction can be drawn among methods of inducing 
people to change their minds on ethical matters, between making 
reasons available to them on the one hand and manipulating them in 
ways that have nothing in particular to do with rationality on the other. I 
do not want to go into the question whether Macintyre is right in 
contending that we now lack the means to draw such distinctions; the 
point is that if he is right, then clearly there is no prospect of achieving, 
in ethical thought with its present conceptual resources, anything that 
we could count as truth in any serious sense. No doubt it is always 
possible for anyone to use 'It is true that. . .' as an indication of 
willingness on his own part to affirm whatever follows 'that'. But if 
Macintyre's Stevensonian picture is correct, we lack what a more 
substantial notion of truth seems plainly to require, a conception of 
better and worse ways to think about ethical questions which connects 
with the idea that there are reasons for being of a certain mind on a 
question, in contrast with the idea that there is nothing to ethical 
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thinking but rationally arbitrary subjective stances and whatever power 
relations might be exploited to shift people's ethical allegiances.l 3 
Earning the notion of truth, in the face of this sort of suggestion, 
would thus be a matter of arguing that we do after all have at our 
disposal a conception of reasons for ethical thinking which is sufficiently 
rich and substantial to mark off rationally induced improvements in 
ethical stances from alterations induced by merely manipulative persua-
Sion. 
Positions like Macintyre's suggest a quite different context for the 
thought that the availability of truth in ethics is something that it would 
take work to establish. The problem about truth in ethics, viewed in this 
context, is not that it fails to be as the intuitionist realist supposes, so 
that establishing its availability requires a different metaphysical basis. 
The problem is that a question is raised whether our equipment for 
thinking ethically is suited only for mere attitudinizing-whether our 
ethical concepts are too sparse and crude for ethical thought to seem an 
exercise of reason, as it must if there is to be room in it for a substantial 
notion of truth. 14 It is really not clear why addressing a problem of this 
sort should seem to require a metaphysical move at all. 
4. It may still seem that, even if earning truth in the face of this sort 
of challenge to its availability requires something other than an explicitly 
metaphysical move, namely vindicating the richness and robustness of 
the conception of reasons for ethical judgments that our conceptual 
resources equip us with, nevertheless, as soon as we concede that 
attaining truth is not simply a matter of 'cognizing' valuational facts, we 
must have implicitly adopted a projectivist metaphysic. This appearance 
reflects an assumption that, at the metaphysical level, there are just two 
options: projectivism and the unattractive intuitionistic realism that 
populates reality with mysterious extra features and merely goes 
through the motions of supplying an epistemology for our supposed 
access to them. But the assumption is questionable. 
The point of the image of projection is to explain certain seeming 
features of reality as reflections of our subjective responses to a world 
that really contains no such features. Now this explanatory direction 
seems to require a corresponding priority, in the order of understanding, 
between the projected response and the apparent feature: we ought to be 
able to focus our thought on the response without needing to exploit the 
concept of the apparent feature that is supposed to result from projecting 
the response. In the sort of case I cited at the beginning, it is plausible 
that this requirement is met: disgust, or nausea, we can plausibly 
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suppose, are self-contained psychological items, conceptualizable with-
out any need to appeal to any projected properties of disgustingness or 
nauseatingness. (No doubt a full explanation of the psychological 
phenomena would group things together in terms of their tendency to 
produce those responses, but those tendencies are not properties that 
need to be explained as projections of the responses.) The question, now, 
is this: if, in connection with some range of concepts whose application 
engages distinctive aspects of our subjective make-up in the sort of way 
that seems characteristic of evaluative concepts, we reject the kind of 
realism that construes subjective responses as perceptions of associated 
features of reality and does no work towards earning truth, are we 
entitled to assume that the responses enjoy this kind of explanatory 
priority, as projectivism seems to require? 
It may help to consider a non-ethical case in which an intuitionistic 
realism is obviously unattractive, and in which Blackburn proceeds as if 
projectivism is obviously correct: the case of the comic or funny. To 
begin with at least, this looks like a good field for a projective account. 
But what exactly is it that we are to conceive as projected on to the world 
so as to give rise to our idea that things arc funny? 'An inclination to 
laugh' is not a satisfactory answcr1!>: projecting an inclination to laugh 
would not necessarily yield an apparent instance of the comic, since 
laughter can signal, for instance, embarrassment just as well as amuse-
ment. Perhaps the right response cannot be identified except as 
amusement; and perhaps amusement cannot be understood except as 
finding something comic. I need not take a view on whether this is 
correct. But if it is correct, there is a serious question whether we can 
really explain the idea of something's being comic as a projection of that 
response. The suggestion is that there is no self-contained prior fact of 
our subjective lives that could enter into a projective account of the 
relevant way of thinking: in the only relevant response, the conceptual 
apparatus that figures in the relevant way of thinking is already in play. 
No doubt the propensity to laugh is in some sense a self-contained prior 
psychological fact. But differentiating some exercises of that unspecific 
propensity as cases of amusement is something we have to learn, and if the 
suggestion is correct, this learning is indistinguishable from coming to 
find some things comic. Surely it undermines a projective account of a 
concept if we cannot home in on the subjective state whose projection is 
supposed to result in the seeming feature of reality in question without 
the aid of the concept of that feature, the concept that was to be 
projectively explained. And surely this scepticism cannot tend in the 
direction of a relapse into the intuitionistic sort of realism. 
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Blackburn himself is remarkably casual about this. I know only one 
place where he discusses the question whether this kind of consideration 
poses a problem for projectivism; and in that place he simply asserts that 
there is no problem for pr~jectivism if the only way to describe a 
supposedly projected subjective response is in terms of seeming to find 
the supposed upshot of projecting it in something one confronts. 16 I 
think this reflects the assumption I mentioned earlier, that if we arc not 
realists of the unsatisfactorily intuitionistic sort then we cannot but be 
projectivists. 
Blackburn's view of the available options is well summed up in these 
words of his (they apply to morality in particular, but the structure is 
quite general): 
The projectivist holds that our naiUre as moralists is well explained by regarding 
us as reacting to a reality which contains nothing in the way of values, duties, 
rights and so forth; a realist thinks it is well explained only by seeing us as able to 
perceive, cognize, intuit, an independent moral reality. He holds that the moral 
features of things are the parents of our sentiments, whereas the Humcan holds 
that they are their children .'7 
Realism here is the unsatisfactory position that helps itself to an 
unearned notion of truth. So if the choice is the one Blackburn offers in 
this passage, it seems compulsory to opt for regarding the 'features of 
things' that are in question as children of our sentiments rather than 
their parents. There is no room to raise a problem about whether the 
sentiments have the requisite explanatory independence. But why do we 
have to limit ourselves to those two options? What about a position 
which says that the extra features are neither parents nor children of our 
sentiments, but-if we must find an apt metaphor from the field of 
kinship relations-siblings? 18 Such a view would be appropriate for 
amusement and the comic, if that case is as I have suggested it might be. 
Denying that the extra features are prior to the relevant sentiments, 
such a view distances itself from the idea that they belong, mysteriously, 
in a reality that is wholly independent of our subjectivity and set over 
against it. It docs not follow that the sentiments have a priority. If there 
is no comprehending the right sentiments independently of the concepts 
of the relevant extra features, a no-priority view is surely indicated. 
There are two possible ways of not being an intuitionistie realist, and the 
image of projection really fits only one of them. 
In the case of the comic, the threat in face of which it would be 
necessary to earn truth-if one wanted to-would not be that any 
persuasion seems indistinguishable from manipulation; argument is not 
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an important ingredient in that part of our lives. (The attempt to 
persuade someone that something is funny is typically self-defeating.) 
But there is a sameness underlying this difference. In both cases, the 
threat to a substantial notion of truth lies in the idea that there is nothing 
really to choose between different sensibilities, and that any convergence 
is best thought of as a mere coincidence of subjectivities rather than 
agreement on a range of truths-the sort of view that would be natural if 
everyone came to prefer one flavour of ice cream to any other. And in 
both cases, the threatening thought can be put like this: different 
sensibilities cannot be ranked according to whether there are better 
reasons for one sensibility's response than another's. Whether or not the 
sensibilities are conceived as typically altered by argument, so that the 
issue can be whether persuading someone counts as giving him reasons 
to change his mind, the challenge can be put as a query whether a mode 
of thought that engages subjective responses allows for a sufficiently 
substantial conception of reasons for exercises of it to be capable of 
truth. 
The interest of the no-priority view, now, is that it opens up the 
possibility that it might be respectable to use the apparently world-
describing conceptual resources with which we articulate our responses, 
in earning truth in one of the relevant areas. Blackburn's simpler 
structure of options suggests that we must deny ourselves those re-
sources, on pain of lapsing back into a bald intuitionism. A serious 
projective quasi-realism about the comic would construct a conception 
of what it is for things to be really funny on the basis of principles for 
ranking senses of humour which would have to be established from 
outside the propensity to find things funny. The contrasting idea would 
be that we might regard our conception of greater and less refinement 
and discrimination in senses of humour as derivative from an under-
standing of what it is for things to be really funny: something we can 
acceptably aim to elaborate from within the propensity to find things 
funny. The concept of the comic is not a device for a rationally isolated 
grouping of items, things whose satisfaction of it we take to be simply a 
matter of their eliciting the appropriate reaction from us; having the 
concept involves at least inklings of a place it occupies in a rationally 
interconnected scheme of concepts, and we should aim to exploit such 
inklings in working out an aesthetic, so to speak, of humour. A ranking 
of sensibilities would flow from that, rather than being independently 
constructed (from what materials?19) and used to deliver verdicts on 
when things are really comic. Of course we might not be able to squeeze 
much in the way of rankings of senses of humour out of our understand-
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ing of the funny. And anything on these lines that we did come up with 
would be liable, as such constructions always arc, to accusations of 
fraud, on behalf of people whose senses of humour we represented as 
blunter than they might be. We would need to take great care to be sure 
that we were not merely projectively conferring a bogus objectivity on 
the deliverances of a sensibility that was in fact rationally on a par with 
any other. But, although we must of course acknowledge the risks and 
do our best to guard against them, we would not be guaranteed to fall 
into self-deception of this sort, simply by vinue of working from within. 
The no-priority view allows, then, that it might be possible to do 
something recognizable as earning truth by focusing on the funny itself. 
The idea of what is really funny need not be explained in terms of an 
independently established conception of what makes a sense of humour 
more discriminating. This contrasts with a constraint that seems to be 
implicit in a serious projectivism, according to which the idea of a 
superior discernment has to be made clear without exploiting exercises 
of the way of thinking which is to be explained as projective, so that it is 
available for use in certifying some such exercises as (quasi-realistically) 
true. 
Analogously in the ethical case; here again, the possibility of the no-
priority view brings out that we do not need to choose between, on the 
one hand, lapsing into intuitionism-simply helping ourselves to 
truth-and, on the other, disallowing ourselves, in earning truth, the 
conceptual equipment that projectivism sees as the product of projec-
tion. Earning truth is a matter of supplying something that does 
satisfactorily what is merely pretended by the bogus epistemology of 
intuitionism. Instead of a vague attempt to borrow the epistemological 
credentials of the idea of perception, the position I am describing aims, 
quite differently, at an epistemology that centres on the notion of 
susceptibility to reasons. The threat to truth is from the thought that 
there is not enough substance to our conception of reasons for ethical 
stances. When we try to meet this threat, there is no reason not to appeal 
to all the resources at our disposal, including all the ethical concepts that 
we can lay our hands on, so long as they survive critical scrutiny; and 
there need be no basis for critical scrutiny of one ethical concept except 
others, so the necessary scrutiny does not involve stepping outside the 
point of view constituted by an ethical sensibility. 
Notice that this does not make it a foregone conclusion that the 
threat will be satisfactorily met: Macintyre's picture of our present 
predicament, for instance, cannot be ruled out without actually looking 
into the resources we still have. Aiming to meet the threat from within is 
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not helping ourselves to ethical truth in the manner of an intuitionistic 
realism; and it would be quite wrong to suppose that it is helping 
ourselves to ethical truth in the different sense that the issue is prejudged 
in favour of truth being attainable. 
5. Blackburn has purported to respond to the suggestion that truth 
in ethics might be earned from within ethical thinking, and similarly in 
other areas where an issue about projection arises. His claim is that such 
a suggestion merely shirks a plainly necessary explanatory task: one in 
which 
we try to place the activity of moralizing, or the reaction of finding things funny 
... In particular we try to fit our commitments in these areas into a metaphysical 
understanding of the kinds of fact the world contains: a metaphysical view which 
can properly be hostile to an unanalysed and Jui gmrriJ area of moral or humorous 
... facts. And relative to this interest, answers which merely cite the truth of 
various such verdicts are quite beside the point. This . . . is because there is no 
theory connecting these truths to devices whereby we know about them-in other 
words, no way of protecting our right to [conditionals of the form 'If it hadn't 
been the case that p, I would not be commined to p'). 20 
This passage raises several questions. I shall end this lecture by 
making three points about it. 
First, note how the passage still strikes the note of theft as against 
honest toil, as if the target were still the kind of intuitionism that merely 
helps itself to a novel range of facts. This looks quite unwarranted once it 
is clear that there are three positions and not just two. The suggestion is 
not that we 'merely cite the truth'-presumably alleged to be detected 
by some mysterious quasi-sensory capacities-of specific ethical ver-
dicts, or judgments to the effect that something is funny. The aim is to 
give an account of how such verdicts and judgments are located in the 
appropriate region of the space of reasons. No particular verdict or 
judgment would be a sacrosanct starting-point, supposedly immune to 
critical scrutiny, in our earning the right to claim that some such verdicts 
or judgments stand a chance of being true. That is not at all to say that 
we must earn that right from an initial position in which all such verdicts 
or judgments are suspended at once, as in the projectivist picture of a 
range of responses to a world that does not contain values or instances of 
the comic. 
The second point relates to the 'metaphysical understanding' that 
Blackburn mentions. This fixes an inventory of 'the kinds of fact the 
world contains'. It fixes also, in parallel, a conception of the kinds of 
cognitive occurrence that can constitute access to facts: nothing will 
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serve except what can be conceived in terms of the impact on us of the 
world as the 'metaphysical understanding' understands it. That is why 
one is not allowed to count as protecting one's right to a conditional of 
the form 'If it had not been the case that p, I would not have become 
committed to the belief that p' if one establishes that one would not have 
arrived at the belief that p had it not been for good reasons for it, with 
the excellence of the reasons vindicated from within the relevant way of 
thinking. 
But how good are the credentials of a 'metaphysical understanding' 
that blankly excludes values and instances of the comic from the world in 
advance of any philosophical enquiry into truth?2 1 Surely if the history 
of philosophical reflection on the correspondence theory of truth has 
taught us anything, it is that there is ground for suspicion of the idea 
that we have some way of telling what can count as a fact, prior to and 
independent of asking what forms of words might count as expressing 
truths, so that a conception of facts could exert some leverage in the 
investigation of truth. We have no point of vantage on the question what 
can be the case, that is, what can be a fact, external to the modes of 
thought and speech we know our way around in, with whatever 
understanding of what counts as better and worse execution of them our 
mastery of them can give us. If there is enough substance to that 
understanding to enable us to rule out positions like Macintyre's with a 
clear conscience, that is what it is for truth to be attainable in such 
thought and speech, and so much the worse for any prior 'metaphysical 
understanding' which holds that there cannot be facts of that kind.22It is 
a matter for diagnosis and exorcism, not something that can be allowed 
without further ado to be a good starting-point for a philosophy of ethics 
or humour. To reiterate the first point, we need not be frightened out of 
this line by the bogey of 'an unanalysed and sui generis area of moral or 
humorous .. . facts'. That is what one gets if one accepts a familiar 
'metaphysical understanding'-one which is in fact quite dubious even 
in the areas where it is most tempting-with its picture of facts and our 
access to them, and then tries to accommodate exercises of ethical 
sensibilities or senses of humour within its framework; but that was 
never the proposal. 
The third point is about 'placing' ethics or humour. I have been 
suggesting that an undefended 'metaphysical understanding' cannot 
impose binding intellectual obligations on anyone. But that is not to say 
there are no good questions in this general vicinity. Consider the world 
as natural science describes it. It is plausible (although not beyond 
dispute) that that 'world' would not contain moral values or instances of 
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the comic. (This is no concession to the 'metaphysical understanding': 
what is missing is a reason to suppose that natural science has a 
foundational status in philosophical reflection about truth-that there 
can be no facts other than those that would figure in a scientific 
understanding of the world.) Now there is no reason not to raise the 
question how ethics or humour relate to the scientifically useful truth 
about the world and our dealings with it. There is no reason to dispute 
that a good answer to such questions can contribute to our making 
ourselves intelligible to ourselves in a way that we ought to find 
desirable. Finding things funny, for instance, can seem, from a certain 
fully intelligible perspective, a peculiar and even mysterious aspect of 
our lives, quite unlike, say, being able to tell what shapes things have, or 
even what colours things have. Anything that alleviated this sense of 
mystery would be welcome, and it would be anti-intellectual or 
obscurantist to deny that. What is unclear, however, is why it seems so 
obvious to Blackburn that this kind of consideration supports pro-
jectivism. No doubt reflections about the benefits of co-operation and 
social order go some distance towards 'placing' ethics-making it 
intelligible that we inculcate ethical sensibilities in our young, trying to 
give ethics the importance to them that we believe is proper. (It is not at 
all obvious what might play an analogous role with senses of humour.) 
But we do not need to suppose that such 'placing' functions by allowing 
us to make sense of a range of subjective responses to a world that 
contains nothing valuable, or funny-responses that we can then see as 
projected on to that world so as to generate the familiar appearances. 
What we 'place' need not be the sort of sentiments that can be regarded 
as parents of apparent features: it may be pairs of sentiments and 
features reciprocally related-siblings rather than parents and children. 
There is surely something right about the Humean idea of a 'new 
creation' -the idea of a range of seeming states of affairs which would 
not be as they are if it were not for the distinctive affective colouration of 
our subjectivity. What docs not follow is that the seeming states of affairs 
can be understood as creatures of independently intelligible operations 
of our affective nature. These seeming objectivities need not be a shadow 
or reflection of a self-contained subjectivity: understanding the genesis 
of the 'new creation' may be understanding an interlocking complex of 
subjective and objective, of response and feature responded to. And in 
that case it is a mistake to think we can illuminate the metaphysics of 
these matters by appealing to the image of projection. 
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